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Article 3

Reconciling Religious Rights & Responsibilities
BarbaraL Kramer*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, in Wessling v. Kroger Co.,' a United States district court
held that an employee's request for time off from work to set up and
decorate a church hall for a children's Christmas play was not a
religious observance protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [hereinafter Title VII]. 2 Although the court recited the statutory
definition of religion3 before announcing its ruling, it failed to refer to
other authority or to further explain why the plaintiff s activities were
"social in nature... [and therefore] a family obligation, not a religious
obligation."4
The Wessling court also concluded that the employer met its duty to
provide a reasonable accommodation to its employee when it promised
to make an effort to release her from work early on the play's
performance day.' The court noted, however, that the employee failed
in her responsibility to "accommodate her work schedule."6 This
remark is somewhat curious because Title VII requires employers,
rather than employees, to accommodate religious observances and
practices.
*Senior Investigator, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. B.S.,
University of Illinois, M.A., John Carroll University; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State University, 1991. I would like to thank Dorothy J.
Porter, Former District Director, Cleveland EEOC, for granting permission for this
article to be written; Walter D. Champe, Deputy Director, Cleveland EEOC, for his
support in this endeavor; and Sue Kramer, for her research assistance.
1. Wessling v. Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
3. See Wessling, 554 F. Supp. at 552. Section 7030) of Title VII states that "[t]he
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(j).
4. Wessling, 554 F. Supp. at 552.
5. Seeid.
6. See id. (finding that because the defendant did accommodate plaintiff's work
schedule, the defendant did not violate Title VII).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(j).
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Title VII, the comprehensive federal statute that prohibits
employment discrimination based on religion,8 at best defines religion
in a circular fashion.9 In a society where the major religious
denominations are well established and easily identified, ° the lack of a
8. See id. Section 703(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a covered employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Section 703(a)(2) deems it unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(2).
The government has enacted many laws prohibiting employment discrimination based
on religion or creed. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12, 319 (1965)
(requiring government contractors and other individuals with federally assisted
construction contracts to refrain from religious discrimination); 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.3
(1998) (requiring same contractors and individuals to provide reasonable
accommodations for religious needs); Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 5
U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(1)(A), 5550a (1994) (protecting federal civil service
employees from religious discrimination and authorizing them to work overtime to
compensate for absences for religious observances, if their presence is not necessary to
efficiently carry out the mission of the employing federal agency). There are also a
number of laws covering recipients of federal aid, such as the Job Training Partnership
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1577 (1994), and the Child Care and Development Block Grant
program, 42 U.S.C. § 98581(a)(3)(A) (1994); and many state anti-discrimination
statutes. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (West 1994). Finally, although §
1981 does not encompass discrimination due to religion, Jews may allege race
discrimination under that statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (noting the concept of race within
the meaning of the statute prohibits religious discrimination against Jews as an ethnic
group). But see Wald v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 357, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 31,497 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that Jews are not protected by § 1981).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(j). Instead of asking what religion is, the query should
be rephrased as to what constitutes religious observance, practice, and beliefs. See also
infra note 23.
10. About 85% of American adults characterize themselves as Christians. See
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS

TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 17 (1993). The early American colonists were primarily
Protestant Christians, albeit with a definite Roman Catholic and Jewish presence. By
the nineteenth century, there was a de facto Protestant establishment in the United
States, and Christianity was prevalent in government activities because it pervaded
American culture. See Vidal v. Girard's Executioners, 43 U.S. 127, 162 (2 How. 1844)
(noting Christianity is "part of the common law of Pennsylvania"); People v. Ruggles,
8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) ("[W]e are a Christian people, and the morality
of the country is deeply engrafted upon Christianity .... "); see also THOMAS C. BERG,
THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A NUTSHELL 35-62 (1998) (discussing establishment of
Christianity in early America). Nonetheless, since the 1950s, government has sought
to foster a religious mainstream that expanded from Protestantism to include
Catholicism and Judaism in a general "Judeo-Christian" tradition. See id. at 65.
However, as Stephen L. Carter discussed, the Judeo-Christian mainstream's treatment of
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statutory definition presents very few problems." Rather, courts and
even if they
employers can usually recognize religious observances,
12
terms.
exact
in
religion
of
concept
the
define
cannot
Recent legal and demographic developments increase the need to
clarify this informal "know-it-when-I-see-it" analysis. Accordingly,
additional anti-discrimination and anti-harassment legislation has been
both proposed and passed. At the same time, the United States
population has grown more religiously diverse,13 and the degree of
Native Americans and Krishna Conscious followers has been less than embracing. See
CARTER, supra, at 9. Specifically, Carter opined that "contemporary America is not
likely to enact legislation aimed at curbing the mainstream Protestant, Roman Catholic,
or Jewish faiths." Id. See generally LEO PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER
COURT 59-112, 171-97, 235-56 (1984) (discussing religion and the law in the context
of schools, family, and employment).
11. See Teresa Brady, The Legal Issues Surrounding Religious Discriminationin the
Workplace, 44 LAB. L.J. 246, 246 (1993). "For well-known and widely-followed
religions, application of the term ['religion'] is not so much a problem. The disputes
over whether a religion is a religion tend to occur when the religion in question is
somewhat personal or less commonly known." Id.
12. See infra Part II.A. Working definitions of religion rarely appear in court
decisions. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled
Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 749 n.141
(1996) (discussing courts' reluctance to define religion). One possible working
definition of religion is "a tradition of group worship (as against individual metaphysic)
that presupposes the existence of a sentence beyond the human and capable of acting
outside the observed principles and limitations of natural science, and, further, a
tradition that makes demands of some kind on its adherents." Id. (quoting CARTER, supra
note 10, at 17).
Another approach, which simply describes, rather than defines religion, may be more
fruitful.
To describe something is to say what it generally looks like and how it usually
works. It is not to say what its innermost realities are, and it is not to say
definitely what separates these realities from every other object in the world.
Still, describing a thing can tell us much about what it is. Looking at the past
and present appearances of religion can tell us what functions and forms go
along with it. Learning to recognize these functions and forms helps us know
when we are looking at religion.
CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, AMERICA: RELIGIONS AND RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1992). The various

religions may be described in the context of dealing with boundaries: territorial
boundaries, the limits of our own bodies, and temporal or life-cycle boundaries. See id.
at 4-5. "Religion throughout the ages has tried to answer the continuing question of
Iwho am I?'" Id. at 6. Religion shows people how to live well within boundaries and
helps people to transcend boundaries of everyday concerns and culture, to move toward
God. See id. at 3-6. Religion eludes definition, which "tells where some reality ends,"
because it thrives both within and outside of boundaries. Id. at 3. It "encompasses all of
human life"; it lends itself more to description. Id. at 3.
13. The plight of a Sikh applicant who was denied employment due to his beard, worn
in accordance with his religion's dictate not to cut hair, was described in a recent
periodical. See David Lauter, Fulfilling Workers' Religious Needs Is a Complex Issue for
Employers, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 29, 1997, at 13A, available in 1997 WL 17354402. An
employee who practices the Muslim faith and who could not get permission to change
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variation within many religious groups has similarly increased.14
Religion classes, prayer circles, and the wearing of religious garb
occur in the workplace more and more frequently.15 These events,
while neutral in themselves, blur the line between religious obligation
and religious preference, create confusion concerning the duty to
accommodate, and ultimately give rise to more cases alleging religious
discrimination. This
is especially true where fact patterns resemble
16
those in Wessling.
This article discusses the statutory and judicial construction of
religion within Title VII, derived in large part from First Amendment
jurisprudence. 7 The article then analyzes religious obligation and

his scheduled night duty during the month of Ramadan, the holiest month of his
religion, was featured in a newspaper article describing his struggle. See Bill
McAllister, On Workplace Religion Guidelines, Varying Degrees of Faith, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 1997, at A23. Another article reported the story of a skin care salon's denial of
a Jewish employee's request for time off to observe the Yom Kippur holiday. See
Religious Bias Cases Are Flourishing, MANAGING RISK, Oct. 1997, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
14. Mainstream American religious groups include:
Christian and Jewish organizations and their adherents. It is comprised of the
Catholic Church, the major Protestant denominations and their principal
offshoots [Lutherans, Episcopalians, Methodists, Disciples of Christ,
Baptists, Presbyterians, United Church of Christ, the Churches of Christ, the
United Church Congregationalists, and the Reformed Church in America], the
three nationally prominent movements within Judaism (Orthodoxy,
Conservatism, and Reform), and... Eastern Orthodoxy.
AMERICA'S ALTERNATIVE RELIGIONS 2 (Timothy Miller ed., 1995).

There is now a

substantial "charismatic movement" in the Catholic Church and in most traditional
Protestant churches. See id. at 1. Furthermore, the Reconstructionist variant of Judaism
has grown to the point where it may have achieved recognition as a fourth mainstream
branch. See id. at 3. See generally WILLIAM B. WILLIAMSON, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 9-11 (1992) (examining the different types of religion

practiced in the United States).
15. See Suzanne Cassidy & Mary Warner, Workers Bring Religion to Job, PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 16, 1997, at 8E, available in 1997 WL 6628154 (discussing workplace
prayer groups); David W. Chen, Workplace Religion Classes on the Rise, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 29, 1997, at 13A, available in 1997 WL 17354399 (discussing Torah and Bible
study groups meeting during lunch hour at corporations like Microsoft and Boeing).
16. In general, the number of religious discrimination and harassment charges filed
with the federal government rose from 1,192 in 1991 to 1,709 in 1997. See Stephanie
Armour, Religion, Workplace Collide: Conflict Grows Between Bosses, Devout
Workers, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 1997, at lB. Charges of religious discrimination filed
with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alone skyrocketed 41.3
percent, from 941 in 1991 to 1,330 in 1996. See Timothy Burn, Religious Rights of
Workers to Be Mulled, WASH. TIMES, October 22, 1997, at B8; see also Sondra Meyer
Raile, Religious Discrimination Is a Growing Workplace Concern, KAN. CITY Bus. J.,
Jan. 26, 1998, at 20, available in 1998 WL 9196849.
17. See infra Part II.A.
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religious preference in case law, focusing on the Wessling decision. 8
Finally, this article advocates that as employee rights to religious
expression in the workplace receive enhanced recognition and
protection, both employer and employee accommodation
responsibilities must be clearly delineated and reconciled to ensure
compliance with the law.' 9
II. RELIGION WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE VII

Religion is defined as:
Man's relation to divinity, to reverence, worship, obedience, and
submission to mandates and precepts of supernatural or superior
beings. In its broadest sense [it] includes all forms of belief in
the existence of superior beings exercising power over human
beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct, with future
rewards and punishments. [It is the] bond uniting man to God,
and a virtue whose purpose is to render God worship due him20as
source of all being and principle of all government of things.

While fairly comprehensive, this definition does not approach the
complexity and, at times, irony of the meaning of religion under Title
VII.
This Part will explore the statutory construction of the term
"religion," the requirement that a belief must be sincerely held, and the
conundrum posed by personal and religious preferences.
A. Statutory Construction

When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, it did not define the term
"religion.'
In 1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ["EEOC"] 22 issued guidelines that asserted that Title VII
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.

20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1161 (5th ed. 1979).
21. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

LAW

§ 5.26, at 256 (1988)

(discussing the absence of a statutory definition of religion under Title VII as originally
enacted); BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 206
(2d ed. 1983). See generally Thomas D. Brierton, An Unjustified Hostility Toward
Religion in the Workplace, 34 CATH. LAW. 289, 297-300 (1991) (discussing Supreme
Court efforts to define religion).
22. Section 705 of Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994). The EEOC has the power to prevent persons from
engaging in discriminatory employment practices made unlawful by Title VII. See id. §
2000e-5. To this end, the EEOC may utilize regional, state, local, and other agencies,
both public and private, and individuals; pay witnesses whose depositions are
summoned; pay mileage fees as are paid to witnesses in the courts of the United States;
furnish technical assistance upon request to persons subject to Title VII to further their
compliance with the law; make technical studies as appropriate to effectuate the
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protected both religious beliefs and religious practices, and that
employers have a duty to make reasonable accommodation for those
practices.23 Whenever a court decision raised doubt as to whether the
statute extended beyond discrimination based on membership in a
religious faith,24 Congress amended the statute to resolve the matter.25
While Title VII does not contain a precise definition of religion,
organized faiths such as the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant
denominations, and Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist groups, are
necessarily included because of custom, convention, and demographics-but especially because they are established and easily
recognized.26 This reasoning also leads to the inclusion of smaller and
more obscure churches and sects within the mainstream religions, such
as the various Eastern Orthodox churches, the Methodist Church, and
Hasidic Jews.27 Many small, unorthodox, and often nameless
religious groups also come under the broad conceptual umbrella of
"religion" within the meaning of the statute.28

purposes and policies of the law; intervene in civil actions brought by aggrieved parties
against private respondents; and serve, investigate, and conciliate charges of
employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(l) to 2000e-4(g)(6),
2000e-5(b). In addition to Title VII, the EEOC enforces and interprets the Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-262 (prohibiting wage disparities based on gender); the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (prohibiting
employment-related discrimination based on age for persons forty years old and older);
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-2213 (1990)
(prohibiting job discrimination based on disability).
23. These guidelines introduced the reasonable accommodation theory of discrimination. They did not, however, attempt to define religion; rather, they referred to
"religious needs," "religious beliefs," and "religious practices." See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1
(1967).
24. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (determining that discharging an employee
who refused to work overtime on Sundays or find a replacement was not actionable as
religious discrimination). At the district court level, Dewey relied on section 1605.1 of
the 1967 EEOC guidelines. See id. at 329-30. The guidelines provide that an employer
may terminate an employee who observes the Sabbath or another religious day of the
week, only when undue hardship is shown. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968). Examples
of undue hardship include an employer's inability to find anyone else to work. See
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 712 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd., 429
F.2d 324.
25. Specifically, section 7030) was added as part of the 1972 amendments. See 42
U.S.C. 2000e-(j); supra note 3 (discussing the text of section 7030)).
26. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 256 (discussing the definition of religion).
27. See id. (noting that a 1996 EEOC guideline is broad in the religious beliefs and
practices covered under the Act).
28. See id. at 257 (recognizing that religion, as discussed by the Supreme Court and
the EEOC, includes moral or ethical beliefs about what is right or wrong).
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The EEOC's view of religion is expansive. The view is similar to
the United States Supreme Court's adjudicatory approach to
constitutional issues that arise under the First Amendment.29 In short,
this First Amendment approach requires government neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion. °
The EEOC revised its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Religion in 1980 to include spirituality.3 ' Specifically, the Guidelines
provided that religion was considered to include:
[M]oral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are
sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views
.... The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or
the fact that the religious group to which the individual
professes to belong may not accept such belief will not
determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the
employee or prospective employee.3 2

To the contrary, religion within the meaning of Title VII does not
presuppose a belief in God or a deity.33 Nevertheless, "a religious
belief excludes mere personal preference grounded upon a
non-theological basis, such as personal choice deduced from economic
or social ideology. Rather, it must consider man's nature or the
' 34
scheme of his existence as it relates in a theological framework.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) ("A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying . . . comes within the statutory
definition"). A plurality of the Court subsequently confirmed the Seeger decision in
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970). The dissent in Welsh opposed this
expansive view of religion on the grounds that it granted a benefit (for example,
exemption from the draft) to a class of individuals to whom Congress had expressly
denied exemption. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 367 (White, J.,dissenting). "We have said
that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is the goal of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment." Id. at 372 (White, J., dissenting).
30. See Cummings v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551-52 (6th Cir. 1975), affd by
an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977) (holding
that an employer must make reasonable accommodation for an employee to observe the
Sabbath).
3 1. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 45 Fed. Reg.
72,612 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 29 C.F.R. §1605).
32. Id.
33. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 257 (discussing how a belief in a "God" is not
necessary, but the religious belief must be grounded in more than personal choice).
34. Edwards v. School Bd. of Norton, Va., 483 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Va. 1980),
vacated in part, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that an employee's belief that
she had to refrain from work for an eight-day period in order to attend a regional Feast of
Tabernacles was a bona fide religious practice even though her church did not require her
to abstain from all work during this period); accord Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d
897, 900 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that religious observances and practices extend
beyond those that are mandated or prohibited by a tenet of the religion); Yott v. North
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Consequently, an ideology that contains absolutely no religious or
moral aspects, regardless of the strength with which it is held, will not
qualify as a religious belief, observance, or practice.35
Similarly, predominately social and political beliefs do not rise to the
level of religion.3 6 Section 703(f) of Title VII specifically excludes
Communism as a basis entitled to protection from discrimination.37
Membership in organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi
Party fails as a religious affiliation because the goals of these
organizations are predominantly social and political, rather than
religious.38
Title VII also covers practices and observances that are mandated by
or expressions of religious principles. Protected religious practices
may include specific clothing or grooming styles, such as a certain hair
Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that discharge of an
employee for not paying union dues was not an infringement on one's First Amendment
rights); McGinnis v. United States Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517, 520 (N.D. Cal.
1980) (ruling that plaintiffs refusal to distribute draft registration materials protected as
consistent with Quaker Peace Testimony and family history of involvement with the
Quakers, despite lack of formal membership in Friends Society Meeting); Geller v.
Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 17 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding that a well-established
tradition of having a beard is protected by the "freedom of religion" provision of the
Constitution even though having a beard is not a tenet of the religion).
35. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 257. A charge alleging discrimination based on an
individual's "personal religious creed" that a certain brand of cat food contributed to his
well-being and overall job performance could not be considered a religious belief or
practice because it in no way related to a "theory of man's nature or his place in the
Universe." Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd mem., 589
F.2d 1113, 1113 (5th Cir. 1979).
36. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 257 (giving examples of political or social beliefs
that are not religions such as Marxism and Nazism).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(f) (1994). Specifically, the statute provides:
'unlawful employment practice' shall not be deemed to include any action or
measure taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management
committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who is a
member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other
organization required to register as a Communist-action or Communist-front
organization by final order of- the Subversive Activities Control Board
pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. 50 U.S.C. §781 et
seq.
Id.
38. See Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 505 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding
that terminating a man's employment for his association with the Ku Klux Klan was not
actionable under the Civil Rights Act of 1964). But see American Postal Workers Union
v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that strong opposition
to war is a religious belief); Dorr v. First Ky. Nat'l Corp., 796 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1986)
(working for a church group that aids homosexuals was protected "religion"); Haring v.
Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1183-84 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that an Internal
Revenue Service employee refusing to process abortion clinics' requests for tax exempt
status was a moral or religious activity entitled to legal protection).

1999]

Religious Rights and Responsibilities

447

style, head covering, or the wearing of facial hair, as directed or
suggested by an individual's religious belief.3 9 Persons who have
pastoral responsibilities also come within the ambit of Title VII's
protection.4 °
Religion within the meaning of Title VII is so broad that statutory
protection extends to nonbelievers. Thus, religion necessarily
encompasses the absence of religion.41 In particular, the legislative
history of Title VII reveals that it prohibits discrimination against an
atheist.42 Accordingly, discrimination against a person who is a deist
or an agnostic would probably also constitute a violation of the
statute. 43 Therefore, if an employer hires only persons who believe in
a supreme being, or requires employees to participate in a certain
religious observance or practice, such as daily prayer, that employer is
not religion-neutral in employment issues, and a cause of action may
arise.44
39. See e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (ruling
that a Sikh employee whose religion prohibited him from shaving any body hair had
established a prima facie case of religious discrimination, but that he, nonetheless, had
to transfer to a janitorial job since he could not comply with company policy requiring
all employees at risk of exposure to toxic gases to shave any hair that might interfere
with facial respirator); Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,753 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that the mere desire to promote esprit de corps among
employees is not an adequate justification for prohibiting employees from wearing
clothes mandated by their religion); Calloway v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 20 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 30,091 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that a Muslim worker who was sent home
for wearing a kuffi established a claim of religious discrimination); Isaac v. Butler's
Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108, 114 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding that a no-beard policy
created by employer violated plaintiff shoe-salesman's Title VII rights to wear a beard in
accordance with his Church of God beliefs).
40. See Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Vt.
1974) (determining that a minister's attendance at monthly business meetings of his
church was within the meaning of "religious practices" protected by Title VII). But see
Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that hospital's discharge of
a chaplain after repeated incidents in which he proselytized to patients did not violate
Title VII); Spratt v. County of Kent, 621 F. Supp. 594, 600 (W.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd,
810 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that terminating a social worker for excessive use
of religious counseling was permissible under Title VII).
41. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 257 (examining whether deists, atheists, and
agnostics are protected under Title VII).
42. See 110 CONG. REc. 2607 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (explaining that an
employer could not discriminate against an employee "just because he is an atheist").
43. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 257 (stating that "[r]eligion necessarily includes
the absence of religion;" thus, it violates Title VII to discriminate against deists,
atheists, and agnostics).
44. See Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir.
1975) (finding that an employer who forced an atheist to attend business meetings that
commenced with religious talk and prayer was constructively discharged that employee);
Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 773 F. Supp. 304, 305 (D.N.M. 1991) (holding that
a discharged employee had a cause of action for termination for not sharing the
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As the population grows more diverse, so too have the forms of
religious expression and the need for sensitivity in the work place.
For example, an employer may violate Title VII by requiring its staff to
participate in "new age" training programs.45 While these training
programs may not be religion-based, when workers object because
they believe the training conflicts with tenets of their faith, then Title
VII will provide employees with a valid cause of action.46 In addition,
employers may violate the statute by taking adverse action against
employees who refuse to attend a "new age" training session due to
reasons related to their religion.47
The claimed religious belief or practice of the employee or applicant
should be the sole and exclusive focus of analysis in a cause of action
alleging religious discrimination, especially when an employee is
denied religious accommodation. 48 Title VII prohibits discrimination
supervisor's religion even though the employee did not assert a religious belief of his
own).
45. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628, at 4203 (1998) (providing that "new age"
programs may be conducted by faith healers or mystics; utilize meditation, guided
visualization, self-hypnosis, biofeedback or yoga; or focus on changing attitudes and
increasing self-esteem, assertiveness, independence, or creativity).
46. See id.
47. See id. But see EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that devotional services may be mandatory unless the objections to
attending them are related to the employee's religion). See generally Charles E.
Mitchell, New Age Training Programs: In Violation of Religious Discrimination Laws?,
41 LAB. L.J. 410 (1990) (defining principal features of new age training techniques and
critiquing litigation involving new age training programs).
48. On rare occasions, a plaintiff may allege that his or her conversion from
defendant's religion to another faith led to or motivated the act of alleged
discrimination. While it may be tempting and even accurate to attribute bias to the
employer, the elements required to establish such discrimination must still be met. See
infra Part IV (discussing the employer's duty to accommodate an employee's religion).
For a discussion of religious harassment theory, see Betty L. Dunkum, Where to Draw
the Line: Handling Religious Harassment Issues in the Wake of the Failed EEOC
Guidelines, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953, 957-72 (1996); Terry Morehead Dworkin &
Ellen R. Peirce, Is Religious Harassment "More Equal?", 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 44,
47-72 (1995); David L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis
of the EEOC's Proposed Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. REv. 119, 138-42 (1995); David J.
Schaner & Melissa M. Erlemeier, When Faith and Work Collide: Defining Standardsfor
Religious Harassment in the Workplace, 21 EMP. REL. L.J. 7, 14-20 (1995); Kevin B.
Flynn, Comment, Religious Harassment Under Title VII: Incentive for a "Religion-Free
Workplace or a Protectionfor Religious Liberty?," 22 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 501, 509-18
(1995); Russell S. Post, Note, The Serpentine Wall and the Serpent's Tongue:
Rethinking the Religious Harassment Debate, 83 VA. L. REv. 177, 181-90 (1997); Julia
Spoor, Note, Go Tell It on the Mountain, But Keep It Out of the Office: Religious
Harassment in the Workplace, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 971, 990-1008 (1997).
Also, it should be noted that in many instances, the employer and employee are the
same religion but interpret the tenets of their faith differently. See, e.g., Pielech v.
Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1303-04 (Mass. 1996) (granting
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based upon an individual's own religious beliefs and not those of the
employer. 49 In contrast, a religious employer-usually a church,
synagogue, mission, or seminary-is exempted by Title VII from
liability for actions that would otherwise constitute unlawful religious
discrimination.5"
B. The Requirement of Sincerity
In order to qualify for protection as a religion within the meaning of
Title VII, an employee's beliefs must not only be "religious," but must
also be sincerely held. "[A]lthough the validity of religious beliefs
cannot be questioned, the sincerity of the person claiming to hold such
beliefs can be examined."'" It is necessary, therefore, to scrutinize the
summary judgment in favor of employers when Roman Catholic employees believed
they were obligated to abstain from work Christmas Day; Roman Catholic employer
believed only attendance at Mass was required); infra Part II.B (discussing Pielech v.
Massasoit Greyhound, Inc.).
49. See McCrory v. Rapides Reg'l Med. Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975, 979 (W.D. La.), aff'd
mem., 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating plaintiff's allegation that they were
discharged because of their supervisor's religious belief prohibiting extramarital affairs
failed to state a claim under Title VII).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1994). Title VII does not apply to "a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities." Id. For the most part, only churches or church-owned facilities have
qualified for the Section 702 exemption. See Martin v. United Way of Erie County, 829
F.2d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 1987); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972). The determination as to whether an organization or
educational facility qualifies for the exemption depends upon whether "the corporation's
purpose and character are primarily religious." HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 3.4, at 162 (1997). That determination must be

assessed on a case-by-case basis, with the court considering "[a]ll significant religious
and secular characteristics." EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458,
460 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that manufacturer of mining equipment was not exempt
under Title VII as a religious incorporation) (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg.,
Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617 (9th Cir. 1988)).
5 1. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)) (holding that the First Amendment does not
protect fraud exercised in the "name of religion"); see also Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d
679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that "[in applying the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or reasonableness of a
claimant's religious beliefs"). The Callahan court noted that "[a] religious belief can
appear to every other member of the human race preposterous, yet merit the protections
of the Bill of Rights." Callahan, 658 F.2d at 685 (citing Stevens v. Berger, 428 F.
Supp. 896, 899 (E.D. N.Y. 1977)). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986) (discussing the history of the
Establishment Clause); PFEFFER, supra note 10, at 171-99 (discussing the history of
religion and labor law). See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 9
CLAUSE:
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religious practice or belief that would receive protection under Section
701(j) of the statute, while simultaneously recognizing the personal
characteristics of adherence to a particular faith.52
As a general rule, the parties to a court action stipulate to the
sincerity of the employee's religious beliefs and practices, or the courts
summarily hold that the plaintiff's beliefs are sincere.53 Conversely, if
a claimed religious belief is too extreme or implausible the courts easily
conclude that sincerity is lacking. 4
An action that significantly controverts known tenants of the
professed religion calls the sincerity of that belief into question.55
When the sincerity of an alleged belief is contested, the court examines
the consistency with which the employee has acted with respect to that
belief and the maintenance of his or her system of beliefs.5 6
Consistent action in accordance with a religious belief over an
expansive length of time is not required to prove the sincerity factor.
Rather, workers who demonstrated actions consistent with
(D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the First Amendment precludes review of Title VII sex
discrimination and retaliation claims made by a nun who was denied tenure in the Canon
Law Department of Catholic University's School of Religious Studies, because
application of Title VII to the case would violate both the "Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses by entangling government in a primarily religious function and
relationship").
52. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.4(b) (1998).
53. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 336 (6th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (stipulating that plaintiff's religious beliefs were sincere);
Ali v. Southeast Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D.D.C. 1981)
(recognizing that the sincerity of employee's Black Muslim religious beliefs was not in
dispute).
54. See McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 975 (finding that adultery was not a practice
sincerely held by the Baptist religion); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D.
Fla. 1977), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiff's claim that his
"personal religious creed" that a certain type of cat food contributed to his work ability
was "frivolous"); see also infra Part II.C (discussing how courts determine when a
personal preference is religious).
55. See, e.g., McCrory, 635 F. Supp. at 979 (employees terminated for their
extramarital affairs could not claim they had the right to commit adultery when their
Baptist religion specifically prohibited such conduct); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (employee must establish prima facie case by proving that
he had bona fide religious belief, but that does not include showing that employee made
efforts to compromise his religious practices before seeking accommodation from
employer).
56. Compare Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 5 FEP Cas 707, 708 (E.D.
Tex. 1973) (determining that an employee's claim that his lifelong religious practice
prohibited him from working on Sundays was "grounded more in convenience than
conviction" since the employee had worked some Sundays and not others), with Smith
v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1987) (employee's professed belief
in avoiding work on Sunday Sabbath was found to be sincerely held although he
occasionally worked from 11 p.m. to midnight on some Sundays).
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newly-acquired religious beliefs have been found to hold sincere
convictions .

An employee who truly believes that his or her religious faith
proscribes certain conduct has a sincerely held religious belief, even if
the religion in question does not formally prohibit the particular
conduct.5 8 A person who sincerely believes that his or her religion
requires certain behavior, when the religion in fact does not, may also
be covered.59 "[T]o restrict [Title VII] to those practices that are
mandated or prohibited by a tenant of the religion, would involve the
court in determining not only what are the tenants of a particular
religion... but would frequently require the courts to decide whether
a particular practice is or is not required by the tenets of the religion."'
57. See Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 894-95 (E.D. Ark. 1972)
(holding that a plaintiff who made a New Year's resolution against Saturday work, as
required by the Radio Church of God, possessed a sincere belief); see also Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 143 (1987) (rejecting employer's
argument that employee should not receive the requested work schedule accommodation
because she herself was the "agent of change" in that she converted to the Seventh Day
Adventist religion after she had been hired); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375,
1378-79 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist, had
sincere religious beliefs even though she worked the Friday night shift for seven months
after her baptism because her faith had grown over time); EEOC v. IBP, Inc., 824 F.
Supp. 147, 150-51 (C.D. I11.
1993) (holding that an employee, a former Seventh Day
Adventist who had abandoned the religion after sixteen months, was sincere in his belief
because he had faithfully observed the Saturday Sabbaths during the entire time he
practiced the religion).
58. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 71516 (1981) (holding that religious beliefs need not be universally held within religion in
order to qualify as religious or entitled to protection); "Religious" Nature of a Practice or
Belief, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1998) ("[T]he fact that the religious group to which the
individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the
belief is a religious belief of the employee.").
59. See Edwards v. School Bd. of Norton, Va., 483 F. Supp. 620, 625 (W.D. Va.
1980), vacated in part, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that plaintiff's religious
interpretation that she must refrain from work for an eight-day period to attend a
regional Feast of Tabernacles is a bona fide religious practice, even though her church's
"Fundamentals of Belief" do not require members to refrain from secular work on holy
days). In Edwards, the plaintiff's claimed religious belief, while not mandated by her
faith, was consistent with, and an extension of, her creed. See id. The court therefore
accepted her interpretation of her religion. See id. Conversely, in McCrory v. Regional
Rapides Medical Center, 635 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. La. 1986), the plaintiffs' assertion
that they had a private right to have extramarital relationships was clearly contrary to
their Baptist faith. See 635 F. Supp. at 979. The Court took judicial notice that the
Baptist religion embraces the Holy Bible and the Ten Commandments, one of which
forbids adultery, and disallowed the plaintiffs' claimed "right" as lacking sincerity. See
id.
60. Edwards, 483 F. Supp. at 625 (quoting Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897,
900 (7th Cir. 1978)) (holding that an employee's Saturday bible class was a religious
obligation deserving statutory protection).
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Courts have no business making such determinations. 6
Consequently, even a belief system that is internally inconsistent
may
62
still be sincerely held by the person professing the belief.
Circuit courts have allowed religious discrimination claims to
proceed where employer rules excluded all but "Protestants" in one
circumstance6 3 and favored "Jesuits" in another.' In another instance,
a Catholic who maintained views contrary to Church teaching, and
who alleged that she was denied employment at a Catholic university
with a preference for Jesuits did not prevail in her lawsuit. 6 The
plaintiff also asserted that the university's "Jesuit Preference" had the
effect of discriminating against her due to her gender.66 The Seventh
Circuit, however, denied her allegation, reasoning that, given her
controversial beliefs on abortion, she would have been denied
employment even if she were a man.
C. Preferences: Religious or Personal?

As previously discussed, a "mere personal preference" devoid of a
theological basis does not rise to the level of religion within the
meaning 67 of Title VII, no matter how sincerely the individual
61. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("[I]t is no business of the
courts to say what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under
the protection of the First Amendment.").
62. See Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 673, 675 (E.D. Ark. 1993)
(proclaiming that the plaintiff's beliefs, while an unusual combination of Christianity
and Judaism, were nonetheless sincerely held and therefore protected under Title VII).
63. See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.
1993). The Kamehameha court held that a nondenominational school violated Title VII
by denying hire to non-Protestants. See id. The school, established under a will,
required all trustees and teachers to be Protestants and started classes with daily prayer.
See id. But its purpose, curriculum, and activities had become primarily secular and most
of the students were non-Protestant. See id.
64. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that a Jesuit presence in the philosophy department of a Jesuit University
constituted a bona fide occupational qualification). An argument can be made that
discrimination on the basis of "religion-plus" (being Catholic plus being a Jesuit) is not
necessarily unlawful since all non-Jesuits, be they Catholic or otherwise, would receive
the same treatment. See LEWIS, supra note 50, § 3.12, at 195-96.
65. See Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F.2d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff
applied for the position of Associate Professor of Theology on several occasions. See
id. at 1215. The university repeatedly rejected her because her beliefs on the moral
theology and public policy of abortion were perceived as hostile to traditional Catholic
doctrine. See id. Indeed, the larger question might be whether the plaintiff could be
considered Catholic in the eyes of the Church and under Title VII when her beliefs
clashed with official Catholic dogma. See LEWIS, supra note 50, at 196 n.6 (citation
omitted).
66. See Maguire, 814 F.2d at 1214.
67. See id. at 1218.
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maintains the preference.68 When beliefs or practices are very
personal, even in the context of a large body of believers, courts must
decide whether those personal beliefs are sufficiently religious in
nature to warrant protection under federal law.69
In the past, this question was fairly easy to answer. The classic
"preference" case, Brown v. Pena,7 ° involved a plaintiff who claimed
that his "personal religious creed" required him to eat "Kozy Kitten
People/Cat Food" on the job so as to enhance his well-being and work
performance. The court, however, did not elaborate why a belief in
pet food fell into the category of mere personal preference. Instead,
the court concluded that such a belief could not be anything but a
personal preference. 7 The decision is understandable and acceptable
to any layperson.72
The question of preference becomes less clear and far more
complicated, however, when the claimed religious belief derives from,
dovetails with, or builds upon a more conventional or widely-held
belief system. In Edwards v. School Board of City of Norton,
Virginia,73 the plaintiff, a member of the Worldwide Church of God,
believed that church doctrine required her to abstain from secular work
on the seven annual holy days and for eight days during the Feast of
Tabernacles.74 This meant that she would be absent from her job from
five to ten days for religious purposes in any given year.75 The
church's "Fundamentals of Belief' mandated abstention from work on
only the seven holy days, thereby decreasing the number of days off
the employee needed under her religion's rules.7 6 The district court
nonetheless accepted the plaintiff's interpretation of her religion and
held that her practice was religious for purposes of Title VII, even
68. See Edwards v. School Bd. of Norton, Va., 483 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Va. 1980),
vacated in part, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
69. See 3 LEx K. LARSEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 54.05(4) n.18 (1995) (citing
cases that distinguish between religious preferences and personal preferences).
70. Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1113
(5th Cir. 1979).
71. See id. at 1385 ("Since plaintiff's belief in eating pet food does not qualify as a
religion, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission acted correctly in declining
to pursue his charges of employment discrimination on religious grounds.").
72. See LARSEN, supra note 69, at § 54.05(4) (discussing how personal preferences
differ from religious beliefs).
73. Edwards v. School Bd. of Norton, Va., 483 F.Supp. 620 (W.D. Va. 1980), vacated
in part, 658 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
74. See id. at 623.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 623 n.1 (delineating the names of the seven annual holy days and their
source).
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though not required by her church.77

The Edwards court explained that
[a] religious belief excludes mere personal preference grounded
upon a non-theology basis, such as personal choice deduced
from economic or social ideology. Rather, it must consider
man's nature or the scheme of his existence as it relates in a
theological framework. Futhermore, the belief must have an
institutional
78 quality about it' and must be sincerely held by
plaintiff.
The court then recognized that the "Fundamentals of Belief' of the
Worldwide Church of God constituted the framework of a religious
belief in which the plaintiff sincerely believed, as demonstrated beyond
doubt at trial. 79 Finally, the court refrained from deciding whether
plaintiff's belief regarding abstention from work was a valid tenet of
the Worldwide Church; instead, the court held only that her religious
interpretation should be considered a bona fide religious practice.8"
Subsequently, adverse results occurred in cases decided under state
law. In Vander Laan v. Mulder,81 a dental hygienist sued for
unemployment compensation following her termination for persistently
telling patients about her religious conversion. 82 The court denied her
claim because her religion did not require her to share her beliefs.83
The record showed that the plaintiff was not proselytizing, but simply
wished to share her personal fulfillment with others.' Her conduct on
the job, therefore, was a personal rather than a religious choice." In
view of plaintiff's testimony, it is clear why this court did not discuss
the Edwards analysis when it dismissed her claim.86

77. See id. at 625.
7 8. Id. at 624 (citations omitted).
79.

See id.

80. See id. at 625; supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing cases
holding that an employee has a "sincerely held religious belief' when she believes that
her faith mandates the commission or abstention of specific acts, even if the religion
does not mandate or prohibit the act).
81. Vander Laan v. Mulder, 443 N.W.2d 491 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
82. See id. at 493.
83. See id. at 494.
84. See id.

85. See id. at 495.
86. See id.; see also supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (discussing the
Edwards analysis).
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In Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. ,87 an employer discharged
two Roman Catholic employees who failed to report for work because
their religion prohibited them from working on Christmas Day.88 The
trial court found for the employer since the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate that the Roman Catholic Church did, in fact, mandate
them to refrain from working on Christmas Day.89 On appeal, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down the state's
anti-discrimination statute as unconstitutional because it failed to
protect sincerely held religious beliefs.9" The court announced that the
state law protected only individuals who observe religions with a clear
set of requirements. 9' Consequently, the statute protected only
recognized religions 92 and thereby favored these religions over

87. Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1131 (1997). Although and employee brought suit under Michigan
state law in Vander Laan and a Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute intended to
protect employees' religious freedom in the workplace in Pielech, the issue of preference
raised under each law is relevant to a Title VII analysis. See Erin D. Coffman, Pielech v.
Massasoit Greyhound, Inc.: Can a "Sincerely Held Religious Belief" Have Meaning?, 32
NEW ENG. L. REv. 117, 119-31 (1997). The connection between the analysis of state
statutes to Title VII analysis stems from the fact that both must be considered in light of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment religious clauses state that "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Id. The language preceding the comma is known as the Establishment Clause
and has been the cause of "endless debate and confusion regarding the government's role
in religion." Coffman, supra, at 120. The courts have used the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause to analyze the Title VII provisions prohibiting employment
discrimination based on religion and to analyze similar state statutes, given that the
First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourth Amendment. See Pielech, 668
N.E.2d at 1302-03.
88. See Pielech, 668 N.E.2d at 1300. The employees then sued under the state statute.
See id. The state statute in question "prohibits an employer from requiring an employee
...to forgo the practice of her religion as required by that religion. It follows that the
threshold showing an employee must make is whether the activity sought to be
protected is a religious practice and is required by the religion." Id. at 1301 (quoting
Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 867 (Mass. 1986)).
89. See id. (describing the trial court's findings based on affidavits given by two
Roman Catholic priests). The court stated:
The only requirement the [Catholic church] absolutely imposes upon its
followers is to attend mass. Plaintiffs were not denied the opportunity to
attend mass, and therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish that they were forced to
forgo a practice required by their religion. The fact that the plaintiffs wished
to further observe the Christmas holiday does not constitute a religious
requirement.
Id.
90. See id. at 1304.
91. See id. at 1303.
92. See id.
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unrecognized religions.93 The court held that favoritism toward
recognized religion violated the Establishment Clause.9 4 Additionally,
the court reasoned that, by protecting only those practices mandated by
a religion, the statute forced courts to discern which acts are required
by a religion and which are not. 95 Such a mandate creates excessive
government entanglement with religion that violates the Establishment
Clause.96

A person's sincerity, however, has little, if any, bearing on the
issue of whether a belief is a religious or a personal preference. 97 For
instance, a sincerely held belief or practice can nevertheless be a
personal preference.98 This is especially critical when the organized or
mainstream religion to which the employee professes allegiance does
not require the claimed belief.99 An individual's personal religion may
be so subjective that the individual may be the only person who knows
whether he or she really believes what he or she purports to believe."°
Another consideration is that when the court equates the sincerity of
a person's belief with the religious nature of that belief, the court must
ultimately determine the truth or falsity of that belief. 10 1 Such
determinations lead to both excessive entanglement with religion and
potentially unequal treatment for individuals whose beliefs are not
regarded as religious by a court, administrative agency, or other factfinders. 0 2
An emphasis on the sincerity of the belief rather than on
°3
religiousness
may avoid unequal
result,
however,
protects and accommodates
every treatment.
sincerely heldThe
belief,
regardless
of
93. See id. at 1304.
94. See id. If religious beliefs are sincerely held, "they are entitled to the same
protection as those widely held by others." Id.
95. See id. at 1303 (citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir.
1978)).
96. See id. at 1304.
97. See LARSEN, supra note 69, § 54.05(4) n.23.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-94 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). This subjectivity breathes further life to the old quip that "[tihere is only
one true church and currently I am its only member."
101. See Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the
amorphous nature of a sincerity analysis).
102. See Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1303 (Mass.
1996). "A statute that prefers one or more religions over another violates the
[E]stablishment [C]lause." Id.
103. See Coffman, supra note 87, at 149-50 (discussing the excessive entanglement
with religion that results when courts define the religiousness of an individual's belief
and sincerity of that belief).

1999]

Religious Rights and Responsibilities

457

whether the belief is religious or reasonable. °4 This approach,
however, trivializes religion in the eyes of employer and employee:
"[A]nyone can walk into one of our restaurants and say they have a
sincere religious belief that they must wear torn jeans and a Grateful
Dead T-shirt."'0 5 This takes on additional significance when the
claimed belief or observance is a religious preference.0 6 If religion is
a choice, something that can be changed at will, unlike one's race, then
it may not even be viewed as a civil rights issue deserving of legal
protection. 107 The Wessling case, with its curious reference to an
employee's duty to accommodate' 0 8 the workplace expression of her
or his religion, may hold the key to circumventing the frustrating
religious/sincerity analytical framework.
III.

WESSLING V. KROGER CO.

Patricia Wessling had been hired by the Kroger Company at their
Livonia Meat Packing Plant on September 24, 1973.'09 When the
Kroger Company terminated her on December 27, 1979, she was
working as a wrapper-packer in the "Pork Room" and was paid at the
"utility" rate. 10 She and all the other employees in the pork room
were "trained to [perform,] and did in fact [perform,] each of the jobs
and stations in the Pork Room on a regular rotating basis."'' Mrs.
Wessling, an adherent of the Roman Catholic faith, was raising her
104. See id.
105. Lauter, supra note 13 (quoting Domino Pizza Vice President Tim McIntyre who
defended Domino's decision not to hire an applicant based on his refusal to shave his
beard in accordance with Domino's policy, even though the applicant's religion requires
him not to cut his hair).
106. For example, a Roman Catholic employee, scheduled to work Sunday mornings,
might request time off to attend Mass at a spectacularly beautiful church, even though
several Saturday afternoon and early Sunday morning Masses are held at other local
churches. See KEvIN ORLIN JOHNSON, WHY Do CATHOLICS Do THAT? A GUIDE TO THE
TEACHINGS AND PRACTICES OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH xiv (1994) (formerly entitled
EXPRESSIONS OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH). The employee would be expressing a personal

preference, because the Church teaches that Mass is the same whether celebrated in a
sumptuous cathedral or an austere chapel. See id. If the individual's reason for doing
this is liturgical, such as a Byzantine Mass, his practice would likely be considered both
religious and a personal preference; hence, a religious preference. See id.
107. See Lauter, supra note 13. "That's not a view that any adherent of a religious
faith could share . . . . When it comes to people's religions, we don't view that as a
'choice.' Religion is part of what people are, who they are." Id. (quoting Orthodox
Jewish Group Agudath Israel representative Abba Cohen).
108. See Wessling v. Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
109. See id. at 549.
110. See id.
111. Id.
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daughter under the-principles of the Catholic Church. 12 Mrs.
Wessling also taught in the Confraternity of Christian Development
(CCD) program in her parish. 1 3 In October of 1979, the CCD
teachers planned a children's performance for the special Christmas
Mass and play.' 1 4 Mrs. Wessling volunteered to receive the children
who were to arrive between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. to don their
costumes and rehearse their lines for a final time before the 6:00 p.m.
Mass and performance." 5 Further, she agreed to set up the church for
the play 1and
arranged to set up and decorate the hall adjoining the
6
church. 1
The plaintiffs faith did not obligate her to participate. Rather, her
participation was voluntary. 1 7 Mrs. Wessling, however, explained
that she felt it was her duty to assist with the education of her child and
the other children in her parish." 8 "This sense of duty was important
to her and it is important to all mothers who work at developing a close
relationship with their children in a moral and religious environment."" 9
To ensure her attendance at church, Mrs. Wessling spoke to her
foreman sometime before Christmas and informed him of her need to
be off on December 24.120 He told her to sign up for a personal day.
She signed the appropriate book requesting the day off and saved one
of her allotted personal days. 12' Due to her low seniority, however,
her request was denied and she was scheduled to work in the "Pork
Room" from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on December 24, 1979.122 On
December 21, 1979, she spoke with both her foreman and her
supervisor, this time asking permission to leave work at 9:00 a.m. on
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 550. Other teachers also volunteered to take care of the various
portions of the program based on their particular skills and available times. See id.
116. See id.
1 17. See id. Plaintiff could have taken actions to accommodate her work schedule by
rescheduling the time she was to be at church, asking her CCD helper to attend the
rehearsal dinner in her absence, or arranging for another CCD instructor or her husband
to substitute for her until she finished her work at the meat plant. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
12 1. The case does not specify exactly how long before Christmas the plaintiff put
her supervisor on notice. Her request for a personal day was timely, albeit unsuccessful
because she did not have high enough seniority. See id. Kroger's shop rules permitted
"only seven employees to take a personal day on any given day, and the order was
determined by seniority of the employees." Id.
122. See id.
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December 24th, 12although
she was not scheduled to arrive at church
3
until 12:00 p.m.
In response to her request, on December 21, 1979, the Fabrication
Supervisor informed Mrs. Wessling that in all likelihood the meat
order would be completed no later than 1:00 p.m. on December 24. If
the entire order was completed earlier, the entire pork room would be
dismissed to leave. 124 On December 24, the plaintiff left work without
permission at 8:45 a.m., the time of her first break. 21 When she
returned to her job on December 27, 1979, she was suspended and
subsequently terminated from her employment for walking off the job
without permission. 126

The court held that Mrs. Wessling's request to leave work early so
that she could go to the church hall and set up for the church play,
receive the children, and decorate the church, "was not a religious
observance [or practice] protected by Title VII.' ' 127 The court reasoned
that her participation was voluntary, and that the plaintiff could have
found a substitution. 128 According to the decision, the plaintiff s early
attendance at the church hall was social in nature, because it was "far
more extensive in time than necessary for religion,"'' 29 and a family
obligation rather than a religious duty.13
The court ruled that Mr. Kroger, the Fabrication Supervisor,
reasonably accommodated Mrs. Wessling by informing her that he
would allow her, along with the rest of the pork room staff, to leave as
soon as the meat order was processed on December 24.'' The court
held that additional accommodation beyond this was not required
13 2
because other employees became angry when the plaintiff left early.
In the court's view, "Kroger's relationship with these other workers
suffered,"' 33 and "resulted in more than de minimus hardship to
123. See id. The case does not, however, indicate how much time it would have taken
Mrs. Wessling to travel from the meat plant to her home and then to church. See id. In
addition, the court's opinion is silent as to whether she needed time and, if so, how much
time, to
124.
125.
126.

wash and change into appropriate clothes. See id.
See id.
See id. at 550-51.
See id. at 551.

127. Id. at 552.
128.

See id.

129. Id. The court did not elaborate on why it placed time limits on religion for the
plaintiff. See id.
130. See id. The court offered no explanation as to why a voluntary activity could be

a family, though not a religious, obligation.
131.

See id. at 552-53.

132. See id. at 552.
133.

Id.
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34

Kroger."1
Finally, the court indicated that Mrs. Wessling had not been35
completely candid about her request for a religious accommodation.
The court further concluded that she had a duty to take every possible
action to resolve her employment duties and religious conflicts. 36 By
not attempting to reschedule the church function or arrange a substitute
for herself, the plaintiff failed her duty. 137 Her failure to accommodate
her work schedule meant that Kroger did not violate Title VII 38
by
denying her permission to leave before her scheduled quitting time.
This ruling was unusual because it required the plaintiff to
accommodate. 39 Title VII, however, requires the employer to
accommodate, absent undue hardship, the claimed religious belief or
practice of the employee.' 40 In turn, the employee is not required to
accommodate, but the employee must put the employer on notice of the
need for accommodation.' 4' Both of these obligations, as well as a
suggested approach for reconciling the competing employer-employee
interests, will be discussed in the following section.

134. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the employer's duty to accommodate
under Title VII).
135. See Wessling, 554 F. Supp. at 552. Apparently, plaintiffs testimony about
her request for accommodation had varied, and her request on December 21, 1979, to
leave work early was not phrased in terms of a request for an accommodation of her
religious observance. See id. The decision, however, does not state exactly what she
said when she asked for permission to leave early.
136. See id.
137. See id. The decision states only that the CCD teachers had made arrangements
for a "special Christmas Mass and play to be put on by their children." Id. at 549. The
decision did not state the extent to which the children performed the play during the
Mass, or immediately before or following the Mass, such that it would have been, in a
sense, part of the Mass. See id. There is no indication that Mrs. Wessling or any other
CCD teacher or parishioner would have the authority to reschedule the Mass. See id.
138. See id. at 552. At least the court had the good grace to acknowledge that the
discharge penalty dispensed to Mrs. Wessling seemed "unduly harsh." See id. at 553.
139. See id. at 552.
140. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (pointing out the requirement that
employers, not employees, accommodate religious practices).
141. See infra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the agreement between
the commission and the courts that an employee has the obligation to notify the
employer of his need for religious accommodation).
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IV. RECONCILING RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER TITLE VII

A. The Employer's Duty to Accommodate
Section 701(j), in connection with Section 703 of Title VII, creates
an employer's duty to reasonably accommodate religious beliefs and
practices of employees and applicants. 42 The statute does not require
accommodation, however, if the employer can demonstrate that
accommodation would result in an undue hardship on the employer's
business. 43 The extent of the employer's duty to accommodate
extends to all aspects of an employee's or applicant's sincerely held
religious beliefs or observances."
Once an employee or applicant places the employer on notice of her
or his need for a religious accommodation, it is the employer's
responsibility to find a reasonable accommodation for that
individual.145 In the EEOC's view, an employer satisfies its obligation
when it offers all reasonable means of accommodation without causing
itself undue hardship. 4 6 An employer who fails or refuses to offer a
reasonable accommodation can avoid liability only by demonstrating
47
that undue hardship would ensue from each possible alternative. 1
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(j) (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also supra Part I
(discussing the text of the statute).
143. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 & n.7 (1977);
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982); Wren v.
T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1979); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574
F.2d 897, 903-04 (7th Cir. 1978).
144. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.5(a)(2) (1998).
Employers must
accommodate an employee's religious observances such as various holy days and dress
unless such an observance would cause undue hardship for the employer. See id.
145. See id. § 628.5(b). Title VII mandates that employers make reasonable
accommodations for those employees "who have notified them of their religious needs."
Id. The EEOC, however, points out that "neither §1605.2(c) nor the Hardison decision,
which is the leading case in this area, define in precise language what is meant by
reasonable accommodation." Id.
146. See id. § 628.5(a)(2).
147. See id. §§ 628.6, 628.7. Although §7010) of Title VII specifically states that
employers have a duty to accommodate, courts have interpreted the statutory provision
to apply to labor organizations. See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239,
1241 (9th Cir. 1981) (establishing that the reasonable accommodation duty applies
equally to unions); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir.
1979) (concluding that prohibition of religious discrimination applies equally to labor
organizations); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397,
400 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing the existence of the duty to not discriminate based on
religion and to accommodate union members by a union); see also EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(2) (1998) (imposing a duty
on unions to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of members and employees,

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 30

Employees and applicants most frequently request accommodation
because their religious observances conflict with their work
schedules.' 48 Several alternatives are permissive and viable means to
accommodate some conflicts that may arise between an employer's
employment practices and an employee's or applicant's religious
beliefs.14 9 One such alternative is a voluntary substitute or "swap,"
wherein another worker with substantially similar qualifications, who
consents to the arrangement, is secured to substitute for or swap
positions with the employee who requests the accommodation. 5 '
The EEOC guidelines maintain that the duty to accommodate the
religious practices of current and prospective employees mandates that
the employer or labor organization facilitate the arrangements for a
suitable substitute. 5 ' Where feasible, however, the EEOC guidelines
encourage the employee seeking accommodation to assist the employer
when he or she knows of someone with substantially52similar
credentials who is amenable to substitute or switch positions. 1
absent undue hardship on the union's operation). A union's duty includes reasonable
accommodation of members and prospective members whose religious beliefs prohibit
them from joining or paying dues to a labor organization, and the unions must represent
employees who need religious accommodations and cooperate with employers to
achieve this goal. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.5(a)(3) (1998). In addition to
unions, employment agencies and joint labor-management and apprenticeship
committees are required to provide reasonable accommodations in matters such as the
scheduling of tests and related selection procedures. See Minkus v. Metropolitan
Sanitary Dist., 600 F.2d 80, 82-83 (7th Cir. 1979) (concluding that a Sanitary District
must reasonably accommodate an Orthodox Jew who cannot take the civil service
examination due to his religious belief); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3(a) (1998); EEOC Compl.
Man. (CCH) § 628.8 (1998).
148. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.2(d)(1). Of course, there are many religious observances or beliefs that do not
pose scheduling conflicts, but that nevertheless may necessitate accommodation.
Examples of such religious observances include prayer breaks during working hours,
certain dietary restrictions, and dress and grooming habits. See id. §§ 1605.2, 1605.3
app. A.
149. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (listing
three reasonable alternatives that the employer in question, TWA, may have taken that
would not have caused undue hardship).
150. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(i).
15 1. See id.; see also EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.6(b) (1998).
152. See EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) § 628.6(b). The existence of a collective
bargaining agreement cannot be used to deny accommodation of a religious belief or
practice unless it is shown that breaching the labor agreement would violate a bona fide
seniority system. See Huston v. Local 93, UAW, 559 F.2d 477, 480 (8th Cir. 1977)
(concluding that a statutory duty of accommodation does not supersede contractual
seniority rights of other employees); United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d
110, 114-15 (10th Cir. 1976) (deciding that circumventing the seniority system is
undue hardship). "Undue hardship [is] shown where a variance from a bona fide seniority
system is necessary in order to accommodate an employee's religious practices when
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A second successful method used to provide a religious
accommodation relies on the creation of a flexible work schedule.,53
This may be accomplished in the following areas: adjustable arrival
and departure times, floating or optional holidays, flexible work
breaks, adaptable use of lunch time or breaks in exchange for early
departure, staggered work schedules, and changeable work days that
allow employees
to make up time missed due to religious
54
observance.1
Lateral transfers, wherein employees are placed in different job
classifications but at the same salary grade or rate of pay, and changes
in job assignments offer another means to accommodate employee
religious practices.' 55 This may succeed when no voluntary substitute,
temporary swap, or schedule modification is possible for the
individual seeking reasonable religious accommodation.' 56 Here
again, the availability of a qualified replacement for the religious
employee, as well as the existence of a vacancy for which the
employee is qualified, must receive consideration by the employer
before this accommodation may be utilized.'57
The duty to accommodate not only applies to employers, but also
affects labor organizations. Under Title VII, labor organizations have
a duty to provide reasonable accommodation for employees and
applicants who object to union membership or to the payment of union
doing so would deny another employee his or her job or shift preference guaranteed by
that system." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(2).
Conversely, if an employer and a union agree to provide an exception to a bona fide
seniority or merit system in order to facilitate a reasonable accommodation and doing so
does not imperil the rights of another employee who is not requesting religious
accommodation, this practice is permissible and does not constitute a violation of Title
VII. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.6(b) (1998). To this end, employers and
labor organizations are encouraged to publicize policies which facilitate accommodation
through voluntary substitution or swapping. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(i). They
are further encouraged to provide a central file, bulletin board, or other means of
accessible notification so that employees who are willing to substitute or swap may be
matched with positions where their skills are needed. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(i);
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979) (failing to
accommodate an employee's Sabbath needs constituted religious discrimination when
there were extra employees available for the scheduled absences).
153. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.6(c) (1998).
154. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(ii). The federal government has created flexible
work schedules by permitting its employees to elect to work overtime in exchange for
compensatory time off from work because of religious beliefs and practices that require
abstention from work during holy days and other periods of time. See 5 U.S.C. § 5550a
(1994).
155. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(iii).
156. See id.
157. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.6(d) (1998).
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dues based on their religious beliefs.' 58 When an employee's religion
prohibits him from joining or financially supporting unions, that
individual should be permitted to donate a sum equivalent to union
dues to a charitable organization. 5 9
According to the EEOC guidelines, once an employer or other
covered entity has offered all reasonable means of accommodation
without meeting the religious needs of the current or prospective
employee, the employer may assert that more action would create
undue hardship to the business. 160 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison,161 however, the United States Supreme Court established an
even lighter burden. Specifically, where accommodation measures
create more than a de minimus financial cost, employers are not
required to accommodate the employee's religious beliefs or
practices. 162 The Court further announced that undue hardship will be
158. See Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that employee's requested accommodation-payment of union dues to a
charity-was reasonable); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589
F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1978) (determining that the employee's payment of the
equivalent amount of dues to a charitable organization was not an undue hardship).
The charitable substitution is the only
159. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(2).
accommodation required of an employer or labor organization under Title VII. See id.
The statute requires reasonable accommodation, but does not oblige an employer or
union to accommodate the religious practices of an employee in exactly the manner
requested or preferred by that individual. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479
U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (concluding that an employer does not have to choose a particular
accommodation); Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir.
1984) (determining that an employer does not have to adopt the exact measures of the
employee); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145 (5th Cir. 1982)
(establishing that the employer's accommodation was reasonable regardless of the
variance from the employee's request).
Section 169 of the National Labor Relations Act ["NLRA"] offers a similar, albeit
narrower, provision that allows employees with religious objections to union
membership or to the payment of union dues to pay an equivalent amount to a
non-religious or non-labor related charity designated by agreement or, in some
instances, selected by the employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1994). In contrast to Title
VII, however, the NLRA requires that a religious objector belong to a bona fide religion
that has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially
contributing to labor organizations. See id.
160. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.7(a) (1998).
161. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
162. See id. at 84. In particular, the Court reasoned that to accommodate Hardison,
the employer would have had to pay substitute employees a premium wage. See id. at 81,
84. This expense exceeded the ceiling allowance of a de minimus cost and therefore
constituted an undue hardship. See id. at 84.
Hardison was a member of the Worldwide Church of God, which observes the Sabbath
from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday. See id. at 67. He was, therefore, unable to
work on Saturdays due to his religious beliefs. See id. The employer made an initial
effort to find him another position where his hours would not conflict with the Sabbath.
See id. at 68. After this effort failed, the airline told Hardison that he could not swap his
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recognized if accommodation would require variance from a bona fide
seniority system that would result in another employee63 being denied
his job or shift preference as guaranteed by the system.
Subsequent to this decision, conflicts arose as to whether the
concepts of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" are
one duty, or whether an employer has two separate obligations to offer
both "reasonable accommodations" and demonstrate that any proposed
accommodation would pose an "undue hardship."' 164 In Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court resolved this
dilemma in holding that an employer met its obligation under Section
7010) when it is established that the employer had offered a reasonable
accommodation to the employee.1 65 Hence, an employer has no
obligation to either accept or prove the unreasonableness of an
employee's suggested accommodation. 166 The Court decided, in
effect, that the absence of "undue hardship" for proposed
accommodations is merely one factor in determining the "reasonableness" of the employer's proffered accommodation. 67
The EEOC guidelines recognize that the feasibility of
accommodation may vary between employers. What might be
considered reasonable for one employer may constitute a hardship for
another.168 For this reason, decisions demand a case-by-case
determination. 69 Factors used to determine the feasibility of the
reasonable accommodation will include the employer's size, operating
costs, cost of making the required accommodation, and other
shift with another employee or work only four days a week. See id. at 68. The employer
eventually discharged Hardison due to unexcused absences. See id. at 69.
163. See id. at 81. Although the formal seniority system utilized by the airline
strengthened the Court's conclusion, section 7010) does not require an employer to
disregard objectively neutral methods for assignment of preferred working days. See
Brener, 671 F.2d at 144-45.
164. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 258 (providing an overview of the differences of
the two concepts and how many interpretations collapse the two concepts into one
duty).
165. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (concluding that an
employer does not have two separate obligations, only the obligation to offer
reasonable accommodation to the employee).
166. See id. This conflicts with the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Religion, which state that "when there is more than one means of accommodation which
would not cause undue hardship, the employer ... must offer the alternative which least
disadvantages the individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities." 29
C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1998); see Sonny Franklin Miller, Note, Religious
Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L. 789, 794 n.46
(1997).
167. See PLAYER, supra note 21, at 59-60.
168. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.5(b) (1998).
169. See id.
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intangible factors "peculiar to that particular entity." 170
Unfortunately, most judicial decisions based on Hardison have
adopted a more superficial approach, in which "virtually all cost
alternatives have been declared unduly harsh simply because a loss is
involved."' 1 As a result, the burden on employers has become
unreasonably light and-as in the Wessling case, where the accommodation for the religious employee consisted of an offer to let not only
leave early upon completion of the day's
her, but the entire department
72
1
ludicrous.
work-almost
B. The Employee's Duty Under the Reasonable Accommodation
Standard
EEOC guidelines note that an employee or applicant does not have a
duty to cooperate or accept a means of accommodation suggested by
employers and other covered entities, when an accommodation is

needed for his or her religious beliefs and practices. 173 The EEOC has
maintained that an employee's refusal to accept whatever accommodations an employer, union, or other entity may offer is irrelevant to the
issue of whether it has fulfilled its duty to accommodate the religious
needs of the individual worker.' 74

Several courts have rejected the EEOC's position. These courts
attribute a limited responsibility to reasonably cooperate with
accommodation undertakings to ensure fairness to all parties.' 75 Both
170. Id.
17 1. Miller, supra note 166, at 795 (quoting Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The
Employer's Duty to Accommodate Religious Practices Under Title VII After Ansonia
Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 514 (1989)).
172. See Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace:
Title VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2513, 2513 (1996)
(advocating a higher standard of reasonable accommodation upon employers). But see
Hunter C. Carroll, Note, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Collision
Between Religion and the Workplace Has Employers Caught in the Middle, 20:2 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 353, 379-80 (1996) (arguing that inconsistent case law makes it difficult
for employers to know how to reasonably accommodate employees).
173. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.5(a)(1)(1998).
174. See id. The Commission does acknowledge, though, that an employee who fails
to cooperate or accept an accommodation may subject himself to adverse or disciplinary
action where the employer offered all reasonable accommodation without undue
hardship, or may make accommodation impossible to achieve by virtue of his or her
reluctance or refusal to cooperate. See id. In 1993, the Commission softened its stance
when it proposed a clarification that, so long as the accommodation offered is
reasonable, it does not have to be the one "preferred by the employee or prospective
employee." 58 Fed. Reg. 49,456 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1605) (proposed
Sept. 1993).
175. See, e.g., Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 593
(11 th Cir. 1994) ("While we recognize an employer's duty to reasonably accommodate
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the EEOC and the courts agree that an employee has an obligation to
notify the employer, labor organization, or other covered entity of his
need for a religious accommodation.1 76 Actions alone do not give
sufficient notice to the employer of the need for a religious accommodation. 7 7 The EEOC guidelines advocate that once an employee
places the employer on notice of the need for a religious accommodation, the employee has satisfied his obligations under Title VII. The
employer's duty to178accommodate, however, arises only after such
notification occurs.
The Wessling court did not clearly conclude whether the employee
gave a notice of a need to accommodate.179 The fact that the employer
took steps to accommodate the employee under Title VII, however,
strongly suggests that the employee gave sufficient information to
invoke the employer's obligation. 80 To the extent that the children's
play and preparation was part of or contiguous with the Mass, Mrs.
Wessling was more likely than not engaging in a religious
observance.'8' By not offering an accommodation geared to the
the religious practices of its employee, we likewise recognize an employee's duty to
make a good faith attempt to accommodate his religious needs through means offered by
the employer."); Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994)
("The defendant's efforts to reach a reasonable accommodation triggered Mr. Lee's duty
to cooperate."); United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110, 113-14 (10th Cir.
1976) (concluding that an employee has a duty to cooperate with the employer's
reasonable means of accommodation offered). "An employee shirks his duties to try to
accommodate himself or to cooperate with his employer in reaching an accommodation
by a mere recalcitrant citation of religious precepts. Nor can he thereby shift all
responsibility for accommodation to his employer." Yott v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d
1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1977)).
176. See Chrysler Corp., 561 F.2d at 1285-86 (noting that the employee has the duty
to inform his employer of the need for an accommodation and to make the employer
aware of those tenets of his religion that conflict with the ability to perform the job); 29
C.F.R. §1605.2(c)(1).
177. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 628.5(a)(1)(1998).
Specifically, the
guidelines provide that "[t]he Commission and the courts, however, do agree that an
employee has an obligation to make his employer or any other covered entity of his/her
needs for a religious accommodation." Id.
178. See id. According to EEOC's regulations, a prospective employee is not
obligated to inform a prospective employer of a need for accommodation. It is only
after an applicant has been hired that the duty to inform arises, because that is when the
need for accommodation arises. See 29 C.F.R. §1605.3(b).
179. See Wessling v. Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (finding
that adequate notice of a need for accommodation was not given); see also supra note 121
(discussing Wessling).
180. See Wessling, 554 F. Supp. at 552; supra text accompanying note 124
(discussing accommodations made by Wessling's employer).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100 (discussing the difference between
personal preference and religious belief).
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plaintiff's request, such as allowing her to seek a voluntary substitute
or job swap, it is doubtful that the defendant met its duty to
accommodate. 82 By walking out without trying to change or lessen
her duties for the preparation of the Mass and the play, the plaintiff did
not fulfill her duty to cooperate either. 183 Sadly, what is certain is that
there was no "bilateral cooperation... appropriate in the search for an
acceptable reconciliation."' 184 Ideally, this should always be the
hallmark of any discussion concerning religion in the workplace.
C. Faith and Work
American religious history has been described as the "paradoxical
story of the of religions and the oneness of religion in the United
States."' 85 The "manyness of religion" embodies religious pluralism;
it refers to the distinct religions of the many peoples who have settled
in the United States. 8 6 Conversely, the "oneness of religion"
encompasses the religious unity experienced by Americans. 187 It
refers to the "dominant public cluster of organizations, ideas, and
moral values that have characterized this country."' 18 8 It celebrates the
aspects 89of religious faith that people share throughout the United
States.1
The religion of oneness or unity is also known as American civil
religion.' 90 It has supplied a continuing theme in American public life
and has collapsed boundaries between peoples, thereby transforming
them into "partisans of the center.""'' Historically, civil religion in the
92
United States has been mostly white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestants.
182. See Wessling, 554 F. Supp. at 550. The company simply directed Wessling to
apply for a personal day and wait to be let go early with the rest of the department, as it
would have for other employees with requests unrelated to religion. See id.
183. See id. at 550-51. For example, Mrs. Wessling might have purchased and put up
decorations several days before Christmas Eve, which would have lessened the amount of
time off she needed. See id. at 552.
184. Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982).
185.
186.

ALBANESE, supra note 12, at 12.
See id.

187. See id. European travelers in the nineteenth century reported that America
seemed more religious than any other country they had visited. This was probably
because new U.S. residents and citizens, who may have taken their faith for granted in
their native lands, had to become actively involved in institutional religion and
practiced their inherited faith with "self-conscious deliberateness." See id. at 13.
188.

Id. at 12.

189. Seeid.
190. See id. at 13.
191.

See id.

192. See id. Although American civil religion borrowed the forms of primarily
Protestant Christian religion, its content was political. See Yehudah Mirsky, Note,
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But this civil religion is also the daily religion of American culture,
transmitted through and observed in the media, the public school
system, and commercial networks. 93 Ultimately it is carried into the
workplaces of America.
The civil religion has attracted persons of all religions and of no
religion. By linking political ideas and institutions, naturally shared by
all citizens, to their mutual, heartfelt sentiments and aspirations,
American civil religion has unified a religiously diverse, modern
society. 194 Ironically, the very Protestants who begat the unifying civil
religion also introduced the beginnings of personal choice and
consequently, variety, in religion. 95
When a large majority of Americans of all religions and no religion
revere and observe American civil religion, places of employment can
operate in a fairly standard manner. Under such conditions only
religious minorities are likely to experience conflicts between generally
accepted business procedures and their religious beliefs and
practices." In these circumstances, the easy "de minimus cost" duty
placed on employers may be tolerable, though hardly acceptable in a
just society. 197
As diversity increases both among and within religious groups, the
standard for reasonable accommodation required of employers, labor
organizations, and other covered entities should be heightened or at
least clearly defined.' 98 Concomitantly, in line with the EEOC's

Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1251 (1986).

Mirsky

observed that American civil religion:
[F]inds expression in myths of origin and eschatology (the Revolution, the
Boston Tea Party, the Great Society, the American Century); a pantheon of
heroes, saints, and martyrs (the Founding Fathers, the fallen Lincoln, the
Unknown Soldier); sacred places (the Lincoln Memorial, Plymouth Rock); a
liturgical calendar of consecration and remembrance (the Fourth of July,
Memorial Day, Thanksgiving); sacred texts (the Declaration of Independence,
Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address); and an all-embracing world-view (the
American Way of Life, the Four Freedoms).
Id. As American historical experience was filtered through religious modes of thought,
the resulting civil religion filled the void left by the disestablishment of an official state
religion. See id. at 1251-52.
193.

See ALBANESE, supra note 12, at 13.

194. See Mirsky, supra note 192, at 1250.
195. See ALBANESE, supra note 12, at 13.
196. See supra Part I (discussing the predominance of the Judeo-Christian religious
traditions).
197. See supra Part III (explaining the facts and holding of the Wessling case).
198. See Carroll, supra note 172, at 354 (arguing for a clear standard because the
courts have varied interpretations of the EEOC guidelines).
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modified view,1 99 the obligation of the employee to cooperate to
achieve a mutually satisfactory accommodation needs to be
reconsidered.2" This becomes especially important when the claimed
religious belief is not mandated by an external religious body or
teaching, but involves the personal religious preferences cherished by
all Americans, as in the Wessling case.20 1
Ultimately, faith and work are connected far more deeply than most
Americans realize. In Hebrew, the word "avodah" represents both the
concept of worship as well as the concept of labor, and the link
between the two is clear.2 °2 Catholic Christians employ the term
"vocation" in a special sense, a calling to God's service or Holy
Orders.2 °3 Most modern workers, however, whether Catholic,
Protestant, or Jewish, are familiar with the more general meaning of
vocation as a mission, a purpose in life, or simply a job.2" 4
Hopefully, as the expression of religious beliefs and rituals becomes
more common in the workplace, so will reverence for the Sacred and
respect for fellow human beings. Both of these are at the heart of all
religions and are necessary for the genuine reconciliation of religious
rights and responsibilities.
V. CONCLUSION

Fifteen years ago, a federal district court decided that an employee's
request for time off from work so that she could set up a church hall
for a Christmas play and receive children was not a religious
observance protected by Title VII. Although the employee, who was a
CCD teacher in her parish, sincerely believed that her participation was
required by her duty to educate the children in the Roman Catholic
faith, the court regarded her activities as social, rather than religious, in
nature.
The court also found that the employer had met its statutory duty to
accommodate the plaintiff, although, in reality, the company offered
199. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's
position).
200. See id.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19 (explaining how Mrs. Wessling's
own personal beliefs of duty, not her faith, obligated her participation).
202. See JEFFERY K. SALKIN, BEING GOD'S PARTNER: HOW TO FIND THE HIDDEN LINK
BETWEEN SPIRITUALITY AND YOUR WORK 47 (1994).

203. See JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 120.
204. See generally ALAN BRISKIN, THE STIRRING OF SOUL IN THE WORKPLACE (1996)
(presenting stories of people in a wide range of occupations and their personal struggles
to reclaim their souls and keep their spiritual integrity and values alive in the pragmatic

environment of the workplace).
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her only a promise to try to dismiss her whole department early.
Curiously, the court commented that the employee had failed to
accommodate her work schedule despite the lack of a Title VII
requirement for a worker to provide an accommodation.
Nevertheless, there is some case precedent in support of an
obligation for employees to cooperate with their employers, unions,
and other covered entities to arrange religious accommodations when
the need arises. Moreover, a few years ago, the EEOC proposed a
modification of its regulations that would allow for accommodations
other than those preferred by employees seeking such arrangements.
Recent legislation and legislative proposals have sought to raise the
accommodation duty of employers when the religious expression of
employees conflicts with usual business operations. Title VII provides
a vague, circular definition of religion and the line differentiating a
personal preference from a religious one has blurred. As religious
beliefs and practices become more diverse and the number of religious
discrimination claims increases, reallocating the burdens of employers
and employees may provide one method for achieving a just
reconciliation of religious rights and responsibilities in the workplace.

